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1. Abstract 
The model presented in the paper fills the gap between theoretical discussions and 
empirical evidence on the macroeconomic reasons of the banking crises.  
It is argued that opposite dynamics of some indicators for different crisis 
syndromes are responsible for the fact that most econometric studies report 
insignificance of some indicators known from case studies to be important. In fact 
influence of these factors is not "captured by other indicators" as it is often suggested 
but "cancelled out" when all crises types are treated as essentially the same. 
Sample of countries was selected by pooling countries with more then 2 
consecutive years with inflation rate above 40% p.a. The sample includes 46 countries. 
Of these countries only 2 - Suriname and Sudan did not have banking crisis (most likely 
due to data omissions).  
Economic discussion suggests that different crisis types are characterized by 
different set of pre-crisis macroeconomic indicators development. We suggested that 
along with traditional measures of banking crisis risk factors some factors work in 
combination with other factors. Namely we suggested that real exchange rate change 
appreciation is dangerous if accompanied with fast credit growth. And in situation of 
modest credit growth more danger comes from real exchange rate depreciation. It is 
argued that it is this opposite influence is responsible for failure of other studies to find 
support for well known from case studies importance of real exchange rate dynamics in 
run-up to the crisis. 
The other two-sided factor is credit growth. In conditions of high inflation it 
supports income base of banks and diminishes probability of the crisis. At the same time 
credit growth during low inflation in some conditions (namely real exchange rate 
appreciation - see above) may well end with a banking crisis. 
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Based on this theoretical discussion we split some variables to capture their 
opposite influence on provability of banking crisis in different syndromes and 
constructed variables specific for every crisis type. 
Logit regression model showed significant expected different signs before 
variables constructed to model different crisis scenarios. Results support importance of 
different indicators in different crisis syndromes. 
2. Introduction 
Studies of the banking crises proliferated in the recent decade with high incidence 
of banking crises in developed and developing countries. The literature on banking 
crises is clearly split into two camps. One camp based on macroeconomic cross-country 
data explores uniform reasons of the crises, the other based on bank-specific and 
country-specific data presents case studies of banking crises.  
One of the striking results is failure of cross-country studies to show significance 
of some of indicators reported to be very important is case studies. The most notorious 
example is insignificance of devaluation in cross-country regressions.  
This study attempts to overcome this problem by introducing a new model. In this 
model it is presumed that banking systems are susceptible not to isolated external 
shocks but rather to complex crises syndromes.  
Each syndrome is characterized with common dynamics of macroeconomic 
indicators in the run-up to the crisis. But some syndromes may involve opposite 
dynamics of some indicators which in both cases may be significant.  
Understanding of different nature of banking crises during and after disinflation is 
very important for timely preparation for corrective action in implementation and design 
of disinflation programs. One of important inferences from the presented model is that 
transition from high inflation tends to be accompanied not be one as it is generally 
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accepted but by three different types of banking crises that may occur one by one or 
some crises may be skipped. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 3 presents review of literature and 
conceptual framework of the study. 4th section presents then data and variable selection. 
5th section presents econometric model, and finally estimation results are presented in 
section 6. And section 7 concludes the paper. 
3. Review of literature / Conceptual framework 
Empirical studies of the causes of the banking sector problems are divided into 
two camps. The first (the older one) typically uses data for individual banking crisis and 
analyses isolated cases of banking problems. Some studies in this group try to 
generalize inferences from case studies (Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) and Caprio 
and Klingebiel (1996)).  
The second camp explores macroeconomic factors of banking crises and uses 
cross-country sample data. Due to availability of data on banking crises experience of 
different countries after Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996) studies, the second approach gained more popularity in recent years.  
The shocks associated with episodes of banking sector problems highlighted by 
the literature include cyclical output downturns, terms of trade deteriorations, 
devaluations, declines in asset prices such as equity and real estate (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1996, Lindgren et al., 1996, Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1996). 
Banking sector problems may also follow successful stabilization in countries 
with a history of high inflation. As shown by English (1996), chronic high inflation 
tends to be associated with an overblown financial sector, as financial intermediaries 
profit from the float on payments. When inflation is drastically reduced, one of banks' 
main sources of revenue disappear, and generalized banking problems may follow. 
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Banking sector difficulties in Brazil and Russia have been explained in this way 
(Lindgren et al. (1996), Dmitriev et. al. (1996)). 
Credit booms as factors for future crisis are emphasized in Gavin and Hausmann 
(1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Honohan (1997).  
To summarize, most commonly reported macroeconomic causes of banking crises 
fall in 3 groups: 
(1) sharp fall of inflation rate, 
(2) unsustainable credit booms, 
(3) balance-of-payments problems and sharp changes of assets prices. 
Case studies results are only partially supported by econometric cross-country 
studies. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) question relationship between banking crises and 
previous credit booms. No study reported support for importance of devaluation. This 
relationship is so obvious both from case studies and theory that researchers typically in 
search for excuses explain such results in the way that influence of devaluation is 
captured by other factors (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997)). 
Cross country studies usually try to directly estimate the probability of a banking 
crisis (using limited-dependent variable models) and identify the variables that 
statistically aid in predicting crises. Empirical methodology of these studies differs a lot, 
although there is a tendency to use some type of logit (or probit) specification of the 
model: 
∑
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where X is a vector of independent crisis factors. 
In regressions dependent variable is a dummy that takes value 1 for crisis and 0 
otherwise. In multinominal models (Hardy and Pasarbasioglu, 1998, 1999) dummy 
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takes different values for pre-crisis years, severe problems and systemic crisis, and 0 
otherwise.  
Inconsistency between results of case studies and empirical econometric studies to 
out opinion arises because the latter treat all crises as essentially the same phenomena 
with common set of reasons. In contrast, case studies show that banking crises erupt 
rather as a result of crisis syndromes where different factors work in combination to 
produce the crisis.  
When presumption of essentially the same nature of all banking crises is 
discarded, obtained results seem natural. If different crisis syndromes may be 
characterized with opposite dynamics of macroeconomic indicators, influence of these 
factors when these crises are pooled in one regression will be cancelled out and 
indicator will seem insignificant. Thus wrong model specification is responsible for 
misleading results.  
In construction of a more appropriate model we make a scenario hypothesis. For 
the purposes of the present research it is important to note the fact that macroeconomic 
literature reports important links between monetary stabilization, credit expansion and 
devaluation. Easterly (1996), Khamis (1996) and Stone (1998) showed that successful 
stabilizations are followed by rapid increase of money in real terms (or, otherwise 
stated, credit expansion). In the longer term there is particularly high rate of 
devaluations among Exchange-rate-based-stabilizations - ERBS (Hamann, 1999). And 
for devaluations preceding credit growth is also a contributing factor. In complete 
version it becomes a sort of high inflation - stabilization - devaluation - high inflation 
sequence (see e.g. Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, and Wolf (1990)).  
Most risky for banking system stages are: 
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(1) inflation stabilization - typically first one or two years since stabilization 
program started; 
(2) end of post-stabilization credit expansion - 3rd through 5th years since start of  
stabilization program 
(3) devaluation - it is likely to follow ERBS. Timing is very uncertain, but 
typically devaluation is preceded by slow down of credit expansion. It may 
happen even 15 years after start of stabilization, but most devaluations happen 
in 10 years period. 
We selected 3 key macroeconomic risk indicators - inflation rate change, credit 
growth and real exchange rate change. During monetary stabilization dynamics of these 
three indicators tends to be connected and all 3 affect banking system soundness in its 
own way.  
During inflation stabilization inflation rate slowdown leads to fall in interest rates 
and decrease of interest rates spread. As a result reduction of real net interest income 
along with other inflationary sources of banks' income may lead to losses and crisis if 
banks' falling real income does not cover constant operating expenses. In this conditions 
credit growth increases real income base of banks and thus decreases probability of 
crisis. 
On the next stage increase in loan portfolio fuelled by monetary stabilization and 
recovery of real sector leads to accumulation of credit risks by banks. If at the same 
time stabilization is achieved by fixing exchange rate competitiveness of real sector 
soon deteriorates and loans accumulated with continued growth expectations may sour 
and lead to a banking crisis. Thus we expect conjunction of credit growth and real 
exchange rate appreciation to be most dangerous. 
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Finally we insist that post-devaluation banking crisis is a special case. Massive 
devaluation almost by definition leads to a banking crisis. It may be triggered by 
external borrowings of financial sector (that lead to low or even negative net foreign 
assets of the banking system), by failure of enterprises working on internal market to 
service their foreign-exchange loans and other factors. Devaluation is typically preceded 
with credit growth slow down of even credit contraction, thus in contrast with the 
previous type of banking crisis here decrease of real exchange rate is accompanies with 
low or modes credit growth. 
Data set available allows us to test this model on data for cross-country sample. 
For cross-country sample we expect significant differences between coefficients before 
risk variables in the model for different crises types.  
4. Theoretical model 
Selection of important macroeconomic factors and their influence on banking 
soundness should start from microeconomic analysis of bank operations. Most studies 
use more of less complicated bank profitability model (see Shaffer, 1993; Dmitriev et. 
al., 1996). Its most general form may be written as follows: 
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П - bank profit 
C - loans of banks (in rubles - R, in foreign currency - $) 
rRC,j - real interest rate on ruble loans (j-th type) 
r$C,k - interest rate on dollar-denominated loans (k-th type) 
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d - default rate for loans in rubles (j) and foreign currency (k) 
L - liabilities of banks (in rubles - R, in foreign currency - $) 
rRL,j - real interest rate on ruble liabilities (j-th type) 
r$L,k - interest rate on dollar-denominated liabilities (k-th type) 
Jp,j - inflation rate for the period 
J$,k - rate of currency depreciation for the period 
Fr - net non-interest income (expense) in real terms 
P - price level (accumulated inflation) 
Model used in this study is basically the same and is recomposed to identify 
influence of particular factors. 
Influence of Inflation rate change 
The model could be recomposed to make explicit effect of inflation rate change. 
PFrPLr1)-Jp)i1((PCr1)-Jp)i1(( LrCr ×−×××+−×××+=Π  
П - bank profit 
C - loans of banks in real terms 
L - liabilities of banks in real terms 
Fr - net non-interest income (expense) in real terms 
rCr - real interest rate 
rLr - real interest rate liabilities  
Jp,j - inflation rate for the period 
P - price level (accumulated inflation) 
This simpler model shows that all the rest equal higher rate of inflation leads to 
higher bank profits. Inflationary environment typically leads to decrease of real assets 
and real interest rates, but operating expenses tend to grow in teal terms. As a result of 
several years of high inflation bank's operating expenses remain the same if not grow, 
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but banks real assets decrease. When inflation rate falls banks are unable reach pre-
inflation equilibrium and are likely to suffer losses. Banking crisis in these conditions is 
likely to happen due to loss of capital when inflation goes down. The other factor that 
undermines banks' profitability is decrease of inflation-driven sources of income - 
income from currency trading and float on payments. 
Influence of Real exchange rate change 
Influence of real exchange rate change on banking soundness comes from two 
effects: net foreign currency position income (net foreign currency revaluation) and 
influence of real exchange rate change on credit quality and resulting loan loss 
performance.  
The general identity above may be rewritten as sum of net foreign exchange 
income, net interest income less reserves for loan losses and operating expenses: 
FRLLNIINFEI −−+=Π  
П - bank profit 
NFEI - net foreign exchange rate income 
NII - net interest income 
RLL - reserves for loan losses 
F - net non-interest income (expense)  
Two of the parts of the rewritten equation (namely NFEI and RLL) depend on real 
exchange rate change. 
Real exchange rate appreciation negatively affects banks' soundness through 
credit quality. Appreciation decreases profitability of national producers and 
undermines quality of banks' loan portfolio. In fact appreciation is often accompanied 
with high credit growth financed by external borrowings which leads to accumulation of 
foreign debts of government, banks and corporations. This trend sets the stage for 
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possible devaluation. These borrowings in many cases lead to negative value of net 
foreign exchange assets. 
The other component influenced by exchange rate change is net foreign currency 
income. It is functionally dependent on exchange rate change and net foreign currency 
assets. Thus both variables are explicitly included in our model. More dangerous are 
cases of devaluation, which are usually preceded by slowdown of credit growth.  
$$$$ JNFAJ)LC(NFEI ×=×−=  
NFEI - Net foreign exchange rate income 
C$ - loans in foreign currency, 
L$ - liabilities in foreign currency, 
J$ - rate of real exchange rate change. 
As both appreciation and depreciation are potentially dangerous for banking 
system soundness we have to separate them in the model. We have chosen credit growth 
factor for real exchange change variable splitting as two syndromes (devaluation and 
appreciation) are accompanied with opposite dynamics of real credit growth.  
Influence of Credit growth 
Credit growth in real terms also has two-fold action. From one side, during high 
inflation as we noted (see influence of inflation rate change) declining real assets are 
dangerous as they undermine real income base to cover operating expenses. So growth 
or even just modest decline of real loans helps to prevent banking crisis in conditions of 
highly inflationary environment. 
On the other hand, fast credit growth is one of the most widely cited reasons for 
bad loans problem in many banking systems (see e.g. Gavin and Hausmann (1996), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Honohan (1997)). The reason for that is quite 
straightforward: credit booms typically involve loan extension to new borrowers and 
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even sectors of the economy with no track record that could help to estimate future 
credit quality. 
Here we also face a situation where the same dynamics of real loan portfolio have 
the opposite effect on bank's soundness depending on macroeconomic conditions. For 
credit growth variable we also introduce variable splitting. One variable will indicate 
credit growth in highly inflationary economy, and we expect it to decrease probability 
of banking crisis. The other will indicate credit growth in low-inflation economy, and 
we expect it to increase probability of the crisis. 
On theoretical grounds we have to include in the model three macro variables: 
inflation rate change, real exchange rate change and real credit growth, but the latter two 
variables are expected to have different effect in different circumstances. We introduce 
in the model variable splitting to take this into account and expect opposite signs before 
pair variables. 
5. Data description and choice of explanatory variables 
Sample description 
Cross-country analysis is done on the basis of data for high inflation economies. 
"Inflation stabilization" following approach of Easterly (1996) was defined as a 
movement from an "inflation crises" to "non crises" period where the former is defined 
as a period of at least two consecutive years with inflation above 40% percent and the 
latter as a period of at least two consecutive years with inflation below 40% percent. 
Easterly used a 40% threshold, as 40% threshold level was found by Bruno and Easterly 
(1995) to be useful in discriminating between periods of very high inflation and 
moderate to low inflation. Two year minimum is used to eliminate spikes of inflation 
due purely to one-time price shocks such as changes in key import prices, devaluations 
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or price liberalizations. The year of stabilization ("year 0") was defined as a year when 
40% threshold was crossed.  
As a result using macroeconomic data from World Development Indicators CD-
ROM, World Bank, for the period of 1970-1999 we got a sample of 46 countries.  
Table 1. Groups of high inflation countries included in the sample 
Country group Country coverage 
Transition economies Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Ukraine 
Latin America Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Africa Angola, Congo Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zambia 
Other Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Mongolia, Turkey, Yemen Arab Republic 
Dating of banking crises is quite complicated. To start, researchers have to 
identify situations that can be termed full-fledged banking crises. Stresses in the 
banking system are very difficult to quantify. The data necessary for making an as-
sessment are generally not available and, as a result, dating of banking crises must rely 
on events such as the closure of banks and official support for (and/or government 
takeover of) financial institutions. Generally, banking sector weaknesses emerge 
because of deterioration in asset quality. Reliable and timely data on nonperforming 
assets is not always available and even indirect evaluations of asset quality require in-
formation on bankruptcies, exposures of financial intermediaries to different sectors, 
and movements in real estate and other asset prices—information that is generally not 
available in many developing and transition economies. 
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The other intrinsic problem with data on banking crises is linked to arbitrary 
nature of dating the crises. Country data on banking crises are based on case studies that 
usually do not use common methodology and report uniform data to make cross-country 
comparisons possible. As a result for banking crisis detection one needs to rely not on 
quantitative, but qualitative data collected from numerous sources, mostly case studies 
of banking crisis. In mid 1990s there were undertaken several quite extensive attempts 
to collect such data in compact form. These studies now serve as a primary source of 
data on banking crisis. 
Dating of banking crises is based on two such studies: Lindgren, Garcia and Saal 
(1996) and Caprio and Klingebiel (1999), which is an updated version of original data 
set for 1996 study. These studies employ different definitions of banking crisis, but both 
discern two types of banking distress: significant problems and banking crisis. 
Demirguc-Kunt A. and Detragiache E. (1997) proposed a set of formal criteria to 
diagnose a crisis: 
1. The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets in the banking system 
exceeded 10%; 
2. The cost of rescue operation was at least 2 percent of GDP 
3. Banking sector problems resulted in a large scale nationalization of banks; 
4. Extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit 
freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were 
enacted by the government in response to the crisis. 
A bit different approach is used by Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996). They 
distinguish two type of banking problems "crisis" and "significant". The former is 
diagnosed in "cases where were runs or other substantial portfolio shifts, collapses of 
financial firms, or massive government intervention took place", the latter is defined as 
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"extensive unsoundness short of a crises". The authors acknowledge some degree of 
judgment in this classification, but considering fragmented data from case studies they 
assets this remains the only option available for off-site researcher. 
Caprio and Klingebiel (CK) collected data on 165 episodes of bank insolvency 
since the late 1970s, of which 114 are episodes of systemic banking crisis (much or all 
of bank capital were exhausted) in 93 countries and 51 episodes of borderline and non-
systemic banking crisis in 46 countries. "It relies upon the assessment of a variety of 
finance professionals. Only published sources or interviews with experts familiar with 
individual episodes were employed. The dates attached to the crises reviewed those 
generally accepted by finance experts familiar with the countries. Some judgment has 
gone into the list [of systemic episodes]."  
Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (LGS) collected data of IMF desk economists, Sheng 
(1996), Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Sundararajan and Balino (1991), and various 
official and news publications. Two general classes of bank distress are identified: 
"crisis" and "significant" problems. The authors acknowledge some degree of judgment 
in these classifications, but in general "refer to cases where there were runs or other 
substantial portfolio shifts, collapses of financial firms, or massive government 
intervention, as crises. Extensive unsoundness short of a crisis is termed significant." 
Both studies generally specify starting and ending dates at annual frequency, 
although in several cases crises that have emerged recently are treated as ongoing. Thus 
most of the crises have definite length, for some there is also a figure of cost in percent 
of GDP. Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) present it in more uniform and complete way.  
To our opinion data of Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) is better then that of 
Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) not only because it is closer to our days but also their 
definition of crisis dates is more concrete. Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) tend to 
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overextend crises. For example, in Russia crisis is dated as "1992-present". Obviously 
this is too rough definition, as most on-site researches report a banking boom in 1992-
1994 and banking crisis in 1995 with fast recovery in 1996. Caprio and Klingebiel in 
contrast report two crisis years: 1995 and 1998. For these reasons data on crisis episodes 
in this study comes mostly from Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) with reference to 
Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) in case of doubts. 
Table 2. Differences in dating crises between Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and 
Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) 
 Number of crises 
1. No differences in starting date and length 83 
2. The same starting date but different length 6 
3. Different starting date of the crisis 38 
4. Crises that appear only in LGS (1996) sample 27 
5. Crises that appear only in CK (1999) sample 32 
Total number of crises 186 
Banking crisis variable 
Data from these two studies allowed to select and date banking crises in our 
sample. All years classified as "crisis" in Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) and/or 
Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) except starting year were omitted from regression, 
starting year was marked as crisis and 1 value and 0 otherwise.  
Table 3. Sample of banking crises. 
Country Period of crisis Type Length, Cost, 
 start end * years % of GDP 
Albania  1992 present 1   
Angola 1991 present 1   
Argentina 1980 1982 2 3 4.0 
Argentina 1989 1990 2 2  
Argentina 1995  2 1  
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Country Period of crisis Type Length, Cost, 
 start end * years % of GDP 
Armenia 1994 present 1   
Azerbaijan 1995 present 1   
Belarus 1995 present 1   
Bolivia 1986 1987 1 2  
Bolivia 1994 present 1  4.2 
Brazil 1994 present 1   
Bulgaria 1991 present 2   
Chile 1981 1987 2 7 29.0 
Congo, DR 1994 present 2   
Croatia  1995  1 1  
Dominican Republic 1992 present 1   
Ecuador 1995 present 1   
Estonia 1992 1995 2 3 1.8 
Georgia 1991 present 1   
Ghana 1983 1989 1 7 3.0 
Guinea-Bissau 1996  1   
Guinea-Bissau 1988 1990 1   
Iceland 1985 1986 1 2  
Iceland 1993  1 1  
Indonesia 1992 present 1  2.0 
Israel 1983 1984 1 2  
Jamaica 1994 present 1   
Kazakhstan 1991 1995 1 4 4.5 
Lao PDR early 1990s 1   
Latvia 1995 present 2   
Lithuania 1995 present 2   
Macedonia 1993 1994 2 2  
Mexico 1982  2 1  
Mexico 1994 present 2  6.5 
Mongolia 1991 present 1   
Mozambique 1988 1993 1 6  
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Country Period of crisis Type Length, Cost, 
 start end * years % of GDP 
Mozambique 1994 1995 1 2  
Nicaragua late 1980s present 1   
Nigeria 1991 1995 1 5  
Peru 1983 1990 1 8  
Poland 1991 present 1   
Romania 1990 present 1   
Russia 1995  1   
Russia 1998 present 1   
Sierra Leone 1990  1 1  
Turkey 1982  2 1  
Turkey 1991  2 1  
Turkey 1994  1 1 1.0 
Uganda 1990 present 1   
Ukraine 1994 present 1   
Uruguay 1981 1985 2 5  
Venezuela 1994 present 2  17.0 
Yemen Arab Republic 1996  1   
Zambia 1994 present 1   
* - type of crisis: 1 - significant, 2 - crisis 
Sources: 
1. Demirguc–Kunt A., Detragiache E. The Determinants of Banking Crises in Developing and 
Developed Countries. //IMF Staff Papers, Vol.45, N1, March 1998b. 
2. Hardy D.C., Pazarbasioglu C. Leading Indicators of Banking Crises: Was Asia Different? //IMF 
working paper, June 1998 
3. Frydl Ed.J. The Length and Cost of Banking Crises //IMF Working Paper WP/99/30. - 1999. 
4. Lindgren C.-J., Garcia G., Saal M. I. Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, Washington: IMF, 
1996;  
Explanatory variables  
One of the most difficult tasks was to design variables that will capture in one 
figure several aspects of macroeconomic changes.  
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Inflation rate change variable should reflect both reduction of inflation rate in the 
current year relative to several previous ones. Ratio of inflation rate in year t to inflation 
rate year t-1 does not differentiate between shift from low to very low inflation and very 
high and high inflation. Of the several variables tested the best results were obtained 
from one with this definition: Change of inflation rate in 3 years (infl3) – ratio of 
inflation rate (π) in the current year to average inflation rate index for the period of 3 
previous years: 
3 3-t2-t1-t
t
)1()1()1(
3
πππ
π
+×+×+
=Infl  
Devaluation variable was more straight forward: it was defined as Real Exchange 
Rate change – ratio of exchange rate index (1+et) in the current year to inflation rate 
index (1+πt): 
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Credit growth variable was calculated as difference of Credit (Cr) to GDP ratio in 
the current year and the same ratio 2 years prior. 2 year period has proved to perform 
best in the model.   
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Based on economic reasoning we expect different sign before credit growth and 
Real Exchange Rate change index variables in different conditions. To capture this 
effect we have split these two variables into 2 ones. 
Credit growth effect should decrease probability of crisis (or at least not increase 
it) during high inflation stage. As we selected as a threshold for high inflation 40% p.a. 
rate we used it also for splitting variables. 
 21 
(1) Credit growth in high inflation environment: 
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(2) Credit growth in low inflation environment: 


>
<=
=
..%400
..%40,
2
apCPO
apCPICrGr
CrGr  
Similarly, we expect different sign before Real Exchange Rate change variable  
when credit growth flattens and when it accelerates. Real Exchange Rate appreciation 
tends to decrease credit quality (thus, increasing probability of crisis), when combined 
with credit growth it is an early warning for future crisis. Real Exchange Rate 
depreciation which is equally risky is usually preceded by credit growth slowdown and 
sometimes even decrease in lending. . This two opposite effects tend to offset each other 
if real exchange rate change is included in regression as one variable. We split Real 
exchange rate change variable variable into two ones based on the following rule: 
(1) Real Exchange rate change accompanied by high Credit growth: 

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1  
(2) Real Exchange rate change accompanied with modest Credit growth or credit 
contraction: 


=>
<
=
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ACrGrRERchg
REchg
0
,
2  
A – parameter reflecting threshold value for high credit growth, our tests proved 
5% of GDP change in 2 years to be the best parameter’s value. 
Other variables were included in regression to account for other influencing 
factors that may on their own affect bankintg system vulnerability to crisis. 
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Liquid assets of banks to assets ratio – to account for the effect of initial banking 
system’s liquidity. 
We tried a proxi of adequacy ratio - capital to assets ratio (from IMF grouping of 
accounts of credit organizations), but regression showed no connection. The probable 
explanation is methodological fault of calculation that has little to do with IAS or 
GAAP. E.g. in Russia after 1998 crisis this indicators only slightly dropped, in fact it 
dropped much faster in relatively safe 1995-1997. 
Net foreign assets variable of banking system and monetary authorities as % of 
GDP to measure banking system’s and/or monetary authorities ability to counter 
adverse trends in forex market. 
Liquid liabilities (M3) as a % of GDP is supposed to measure effect of depth of 
financial system. In theory effect of this variable is ambiguous as low level of financial 
intermediation may make banking systems too vulnerable to minor changes in 
macroeconomic environment. On the other hand it may diminish influence of banking 
system in the economy to serving overly profitable sectors or external support readily 
available as it would require modest amount of funds. 
Summary of the macroeconomic variables used is in the table 4. 
Table 4. Variables used in cross-country estimation 
Variable 
name 
Description Comment 
Cri Crisis dummy 
(dependent variable) 
1 – crisis, 0 – non-crisis 
Infl3 Stabilization variable CPI in year t / average CPI in years t-1 to t-4 
CrGr1 Credit growth in high 
inflation environment 
Credit to GDP ratio in year t less Credit to GDP 
ratio in year t-4, if CPI is over 40% p.a., and 0 
othervise 
CrGr2 Credit growth in low Credit to GDP ratio in year t less Credit to GDP 
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Variable 
name 
Description Comment 
inflation environment ratio in year t-4, if CPI is below 40% p.a., and 
0 othervise 
RERchg1 Real echange rate 
change accompanied 
with fast credit growth 
Exchange rate index / Inflation rate index, if 
value of CrGr variable is over 5%, and 0 
othervise 
RERchg2 Real echange rate 
change accompanied 
with modest credit 
growth 
Exchange rate index / Inflation rate index, if 
value of CrGr variable is below 5%, and 0 
othervise 
LA_A Liquid assets of banks 
to assets ratio 
Source: World Development Indicators 
NFA_GDP Net foreign assets 
variable of banking 
system and monetary 
authorities as % of 
GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators 
M3_GDP Liquid liabilities (M3) 
as a % of GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators 
6. Model specification 
In our model for cross-country estimation probability of banking crisis is 
explained by a vector of risk factors X. 
)()( XfCrisisP =  
Most suitable for this type economic model is simple logit model where 
dependent variable denotes crisis. This type of model was used in most studies to 
discern between crisis and non-crisis period. But here in contrast we split some 
variables to get separate variables for different crisis types. 
Econometric model formulation is  
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jicrisisP εα += x)(  
P – probability of banking crisis, 
 X – vector of explanatory variables, 
In logistic functional form the model was specified: 
∑
=
= n
j
i
icrisisP
0
)exp(
)exp()(
x
x
α
α
 
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. 
7. Estimation results 
Estimation results are presented in Appendix 1. Regressions largely support 
presented hypotheses.  
At first stage we tried to mimic results of the previous studies by running 
conditional fixed-effects logit regression on the sample without variable splitting. In this 
calculation the only highly significant variable is inflation rate change, while credit 
growth is only marginally significant. Real Exchange Rate change is  as in most other 
studies insignificant. This result is in line with one of the cited authors. But then we 
estimated on the same data the model presented in this study and obtained completely 
different results. 
As before inflation rate change remained significant at 95% confidence level. This 
is a result usually obtained in other studies. After splitting both Credit Growth variables 
(CrGr1 and CrGr2) increased significance but received opposite signs.  
Credit growth in highly inflationary environment (CrGr1) has negative sign. This 
is in line with our observation that credit growth supports income base in real terms, or 
in case of highly inflationary environment - credit contraction decreases it thus making 
crisis more profitable. On the other side credit growth in low inflation environment 
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(CrGr2) is also a clear risk factor. Relatively low significance may reflect the fact that 
part of the total influence is attributable to the action of more important factor - real 
exchange rate appreciation (RERchg1). 
One of the searched results is significance of both split Real Exchange Rate 
change variables - RERchg1 and RERchg2 in contrast with insignificance of the single 
variable in the previous regression. When we isolated episodes of low credit growth 
(RERchg2) from episodes of high credit growth (RERchg1) we have in effect isolated 
devaluation from appreciation. As a result devaluation variable (RERchg2) obtained 
high significance with expected positive sigh (faster growth of foreign exchange rate 
then inflation rate in conditions of low credit growth does lead to crisis). A pair variable 
- Real Exchange Rate Change during high credit growth (RERchg1) also became 
significant with opposite negative sign. Again it also runs in line with our previous 
theoretical discussion that credit growth accompanied with real exchange rate growth is 
a warning factor. 
Our variables that control for other factors of banking system risk in both 
regressions showed expected signs but with different significance. Excess liquidity does 
decrease probability of crisis. In fact even banking system insolvency is unlikely to 
erupt in a banking crisis if there are no liquidity problems. Some of post-inflationary 
banking crises are likely to be missed if banking system inherited from high inflation 
times fat liquidity cushion.  
Sign before depth of financial system variable measured by M3 to GDP ratio 
(M3_GDP) that on theoretical grounds might have appeared with both signs turned 
negative. In shows that smaller financial systems are more vulnerable. Possibly it 
reflects also the effect of maturity of financial system which often implies less variation 
of the main financial indicators. Although this variable is significant only at 90% level. 
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The 3rd control variable - Net foreign assets of financial system to GDP ratio 
(NFA_GDP) although has shown expected sign (negative) is not very significant. 
Possibly, it is a result of the fact that this factor is important only for one of the 3 
selected types of the crisis - namely post-devaluation crisis - and has little to do with the 
rest two. 
In conjunction with this calculation with split variables, results of traditional 
models may be interpreted very differently. Usually it is said that influence of 
devaluation is captured by other "structural" variables. In our model coefficients before 
real exchange rate change variable took opposite signs depending on dynamics of other 
variables, i.e. the type of the crisis. In simpler model influence of devaluation variable 
may be just netted-out as it works differently depending on circumstances. 
8. Conclusions 
The results of the present research confirm the scenario hypothesis of banking 
crisis development. In contrast with traditional econometric modeling of banking crises 
in this study we suggested that some factors of banking crisis act not independently but 
in conjunction with other factors. Moreover in some scenarios influence of the given 
factor of risk may be opposite when seen in combination with other factors. 
Other econometric models that do not distinguish between crisis scenarios miss 
very important sides of the problem and thus obtain sometimes disappointing results. 
Macroeconomic factors work in combination to produce banking crisis and not 
independently as assumed in other models. And some of the risk factors take opposite 
signs for different types of the crisis. Models that do not recognize different crisis types 
tend to select as significant risk factors only those those act always in the same manner. 
Most notorious example of missing evidence is lack of support for devaluation as a risk 
factor of the crisis. That happens because real exchange rate appreciation is a risk factor 
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in combination with fast credit growth. On the other hand sharp real exchange rate 
depreciation that is typically preceded with credit growth lowdown or even contraction 
triggers banking crisis as shows the model presented in this paper. Thus, opposite 
dynamics of real exchange rate in the run up to the crisis both act as risk factors but in 
different crisis syndromes but are "cancelled out" if pooled in one regression. 
The other inference from the model is that authorities of high inflation countries 
must be prepared to fight not one as it is usually suggested but three different crises that 
may occur all in sequence or some of potentially dangerous developments may not end 
in full-fledged banking crisis. The possible reason for missing some types of the crisis 
may be other factors that may soften negative impact. For instance, high liquidity may 
well help bank to suffer losses without affecting their ability to serve deposits in the 
short-run. 
 The full sequence of crises is: 
- post-inflation banking crisis that happens just after start of stabilization,  
- post-stabilization crisis in the end of the period of fast credit growth in 
conditions of relative price stability, if accompanied with exchange rate 
appreciation credit growth is very likely to create conditions of banking crisis 
development, 
- post-devaluation crisis that erupts if stabilization ends with devaluation. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of banking crises incidence relative to stabilization year in 
high inflation-economies. 
Graphic illustration of distribution of banking crises relative to stabilization date 
in our sample is presented on figure 1.  
All post-stabilization crises are concentrated in the 2nd to 5th years of stabilization. 
Devaluation crises are the last in series of possible crises. They are spread over 13-year 
period in our sample, which is consistent with macroeconomic literature. 
Russian experience well fits this scheme. Russia had all three crises. Russian 
stabilization started early in 1995 with effective fixing of exchange rate with following 
10% nominal ruble appreciation. Post-inflation banking crisis in Russia was manifested 
in August 1995 by interbank loans crisis. This crisis started process of massive license 
withdrawal in 1995-1996 (in more detail see Dmitriev et. al. (1996)). Post-stabilization 
crisis in the beginning of 1998 led to some famous banks failures even before August 
1998 devaluation, but devaluation has precipitated even more spectacular crisis that is 
much more known.  
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Bank supervision and adequate bank management are essential to minimize 
potential losses. Regulators and bankers must know what risks stabilization brings and 
what they must prepare themselves to.  
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Appendix 1. Estimation results for cross-country sample 
The model: conditional fixed-effects logit regression 
 Number of obs = 814 
 Number of groups = 46 
 Obs per group: min = 9 
 avg = 17.7 
 max = 29 
 LR chi2(3) = 4.85 
Log likelihood  = -114.43704 Prob. > chi2 = 0.0042 
Cri Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Infl3 -0.0249488 0.012481 -1.999 0.046 -0.04941 -0.00049 
CrGr1 -2.695608 1.310504 -2.057 0.040 -5.26415 -0.12707 
CrGr2 0.0405295 0.022762 1.781 0.075 -0.00408 0.085141 
RERchg1 -3.299308 1.005192 -3.282 0.001 -5.26945 -1.32917 
RERchg2 3.263575 1.19656 2.727 0.006 0.918361 5.608789 
LA_A -.0375454 .0159546 -2.353  0.019 -.0688158 -.0062751 
NFA_GDP -0.34024 0.236622 -1.438 0.150 -0.80401 0.123527 
M3_GDP -0.0399604 0.023413 -1.707 0.088 -0.08585 0.005928 
 
 
Alternative model (no variable splitting): conditional fixed-effects logit regression 
 Number of obs = 814 
 Number of groups = 46 
 Obs per group: min = 9 
 avg = 17.7 
 max = 29 
 LR chi2(3) = 7.54 
Log likelihood  = -103.74085 Prob. > chi2 = 0.0286 
Cri Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Infl3 -0.02687 0.012831 -2.094 0.036 -0.05202 -0.00172 
CrGr 0.0215886 0.014579 1.481 0.139 -0.00699 0.050163 
RERchg -0.0059203 0.027164 -0.218 0.827 -0.05916 0.047321 
LA_A -0.075672 0.033434 -2.263 0.024 -0.141201 -0.010143 
NFA_GDP -0.02668 0.01865 -1.431 0.153 -0.00987 0.063233 
M3_GDP -1.174255 0.649407 -1.808 0.071 -2.44707 0.098559 
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Appendix 2. Banking crises in 1970-1999 
Country Period of crisis Type Length, Cost, 
 start end * years % of GDP 
Albania  1992 present 1   
Algeria 1990 1992 1 3  
Angola 1991 present 1   
Argentina 1980 1982 2 3 4.0 
Argentina 1989 1990 2 2  
Argentina 1995  2 1  
Armenia 1994 present 1   
Australia 1989 1992 1 4  
Azerbaijan 1995 present 1   
Bangladesh 1980 present 1  4.5 
Belarus 1995 present 1   
Benin 1988  2 1  
Buhtan 1990 present 1   
Bolivia 1986 1987 1 2  
Bolivia 1994 present 1  4.2 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 present 1   
Botswana 1994 1995 1 2  
Brazil 1994 present 1   
Brunei Darussalam mid 1980s 1   
Bulgaria 1991 present 2   
Burkina Faso 1988 1994 1 7  
Burundi 1994 present 1   
Cambodia   1 1  
Cameroon 1989 1993 2 5  
Cameroon 1995 present 2   
Canada 1983 1985 1 3  
Cape Verde 1993 present 1   
C.A.R. 1986 1992 2 7  
C.A.R. 1995 present 1   
Chad 1979 1983 2 5  
Chad 1992  1 1  
Chile 1981 1987 2 7 29.0 
China 1980s present 1   
Colombia 1982 1985 1 4  
Congo, Democratic Republic 1994 present 2   
Costa Rica 1994 present 2   
Cote d'Ivoire 1988 1990 1 3  
Croatia  1995  1 1  
Czech Republic 1991 present 1  12.0 
Denmark 1987 1992 1 6  
Djibuti 1991 1993 1 3  
Dominican Republic 1992 present 1   
Ecuador 1995 present 1   
Egypt 1991 1995 1 5  
El Salvador 1989  1 1  
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Country Period of crisis Type Length, Cost, 
 start end * years % of GDP 
Equatorial Guinea 1983 1985 2 3  
Equatorial Guinea 1995  1 1  
Eritrea 1994  1 1  
Estonia 1992 1995 2 3 1.8 
Ethiopia 1994 1995 1 2  
Fiji 1995 present 1   
Finland 1991 1994 2 4 8.4 
France 1991 1995 1 5 0.6 
Gabon 1995 present 1   
Gambia, The 1985 1992 1 8  
Georgia 1991 present 1   
Germany  1990 1993 1 4  
Ghana 1983 1989 1 7 3.0 
Greece 1991 1995 1 5  
Guinea 1980 1985 2 6  
Guinea-Bissau 1996  1   
Guinea-Bissau 1988 present 1   
Gyana 1993 1995 1 3  
Haiti 1991 present 1   
Hungary 1987 present 1  9.0 
Iceland 1985 1986 1 2  
Iceland 1993  1 1  
India 1991 present 1   
Indonesia 1992 present 1  2.0 
Ireland 1985  1 1  
Israel 1983 1984 1 2  
Italy 1990 1995 1 6  
Jamaica 1994 present 1   
Japan 1992 present 1   
Jordan 1989 1990 2 2  
Kazakhstan 1991 1995 1 4 4.5 
Kenya 1993  1 1  
Korea mid 1980s 1   
Kuwait mid 1980s 2   
Kuwait 1990 1991 1 2  
Kyrgyz Republic 1996  1   
Lao People's Democratic Republic early 1990s 1   
Latvia 1995 present 2   
Lebanon 1988 1990 2 3  
Lesoto 1988 present 1   
Liberia 1991 1995 2 5  
Lithuania 1995 present 2   
Macedonia 1993 1994 2 2  
Madagascar 1988  1 1  
Madagascar 1991 1995 1 5  
Malaysia 1985 1988 2 4 4.1 
Mali 1987 1989 1 3  
Mali 1995  1 1  
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Country Period of crisis Type Length, Cost, 
 start end * years % of GDP 
Mauritania 1991 1993 1 3  
Mauritius 1996     
Mexico 1982  2 1  
Mexico 1994 present 2  6.5 
Moldova 1994 present 1   
Mongolia 1991 present 1   
Mozambique 1988 1993 1 6  
Mozambique 1994 1995 1 2  
Myanmar 1996  1   
Nepal late 1980s 1   
New Zealand 1989 1990 1 2  
Nicaragua late 1980s present 1   
Niger 1983 present 2   
Nigeria 1991 1995 1 5  
Norway 1987 1993 2 7 3.3 
Pakistan 1980 present 1   
Panama 1988 1989 2 2  
Papua New Guanea 1989 present 1   
Paraguay 1995 present 1   
Peru 1983 1990 1 8  
Philippines 1981 1987 2 7 13.2 
Poland 1991 present 1   
Romania 1990 present 1   
Russia 1992 present 1   
Rwanda 1991 present 1   
Sao Tome and Principe 1980 present 2   
Senegal 1983 1988 2 6  
Sierra Leone 1990  1 1  
Singapore 1982  1 1  
Slovak Republic 1991 1995 1 5  
Slovenia 1992 1994 1 3  
Somalia 1990  2   
South Africa 1985  2 1  
South Africa 1989 present 1   
Spain 1977 1985 2 9 5.6 
Sri Lanka early 1990s 1   
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 1994 present 1   
Swaziland 1995  1 1  
Sweden 1990 1993 2 4 4.0 
Tajikistan 1996  1   
Tanzania 1988 present 2  6.5 
Thailand 1983 1987 2 5  
Togo 1989 1991 1 3  
Trinidad and Tobago 1982 1993 1 12  
Tunisia 1991 1995 1 5  
Turkey 1982  2 1  
Turkey 1991  2 1  
Turkey 1994  1 1 1.0 
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Country Period of crisis Type Length, Cost, 
 start end * years % of GDP 
Uganda 1990 present 1   
Ukraine 1994 present 1   
US 1980 1992 1 13 2.4 
Uruguay 1981 1985 2 5  
Uzbekistan 1993 present 1   
Venezuela 1994 present 2  17.0 
Vietnam 1996  1   
Yemen Arab Republic 1996  1   
Zaire 1991 present 1   
Zambia 1994 present 1   
Zimbabwe 1995 present 1   
Number of observations   152 81 22 
* - type of crisis: 1 - significant, 2 - crisis 
Sources: 
1. Demirguc–Kunt A., Detragiache E. The Determinants of Banking Crises in 
Developing and Developed Countries. //IMF Staff Papers, Vol.45, N1, March 
1998b. 
2. Hardy D.C., Pazarbasioglu C. Leading Indicators of Banking Crises: Was Asia 
Different? //IMF working paper, June 1998 
3. Frydl Ed.J. The Length and Cost of Banking Crises //IMF Working Paper 
WP/99/30. - 1999. 
4. Lindgren C.-J., Garcia G., Saal M. I. Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy, 
Washington: IMF, 1996;  
 
 
